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WORKMEN'S COMIPENSATION
WILlIAm H. NICHaOLSON, JR.*
Pneumothorax as Compensable Injury
In the first case of pneumothorax (collapse of lung) before the
Court under our Workmen's Compensation Law, it was held in
Colvin v. E. L DuPont DeNemours Company' that such an injury
induced by strain of employee in opening a heavy door was compen-
sable.
Incidentally, the term "total disability" in compensation law is de-
fined in this case as follows:
An employee who is so injured that he can perform no services
other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability,
or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not
exist, may well be classified as totally disabled. Lee v. Minne-
apolis St. Ry. Co., 230 Minn. 315, 41 N.W. 2d 433, 437. Lar-
son on Workmen's Compensation Law, Section 57.51.
The claimant was held to be totally and permanently disabled, not
being able to perform the lifting duties required by jobs of manual
labor, the only ones for which the employee was qualified. He was
unemployed at the time of the award, and the court found no im-
pingement in a conclusion of total and permanent disability upon
the rule of CoDt OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-10:
The term 'disability' means incapacity because of injury to earn
the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of in-
jury in the same or any other employment.
Two Successive Accidents
In Doby E. Gordon v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours and Co. 2 the
question of which of two successive injuries, involving different em-
ployers, caused claimant's disability, was resolved in favor of the
first employer in the Industrial Commission's exercise of its fact-
finding powers upheld by the court.
The results of the first back injury, latent and quiescent until the
second injury, were held to have been aggravated or activated by
*Attorney-at-Law, Greenwood, S. C.; LL.B., 1943, University of South Carolina, School
of Law.
1. 227 S. C. 465, 88 S.E. 2d 581 (1955).2. 228 S.C. 67, 88 S.E. 2d 844 (1955).
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the latter injury. The court stated the rule applicable to such cases
as follows:
The rule is well established that where a latent or quiescent
weakened, but not disabling, condition resulting from disease
is by accidental injury in the course and scope of employment
aggravated, with resulting disability, such disability is compen-
sable. Cole v. State Highway Dept., 190 S.C. 142, 2 S.E. 2d
490; Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S.C. 313, 15 S.E. 2d
334; Ferguson v. State Highway Dept., 197 S.C. 520, 15 S.E. 2d
775. The same principle is equally applicable where the latent,
but not disabling, condition has resulted from a prior accidental
injury. If the disability is proximately caused by the subse-
quent accidental injury, compensability is referable to that, and
not the earlier, one.
Death of Volunteer Fireman As Proximately Caused by Explosion
in Own Shop
The action of the Full Commission in reversing an Award of
Single Commissioner and holding death non-compensable was up-
held in the case of Wilson v. City of Darlington3. The court's de-
cision is succinctly summarized in the following syllabus:
In proceeding to obtain death benefits for death of volunteer fire-
man, who about a minute after he had caused an explosion with
his blow torch while working on a boat in his own shop for
his own pleasure, was seen running from building with his
clothes aflame, and who, while waiting for ambulance after
flames on clothing were extinguished, directed some of the fire
fighting but thereafter died, question whether the initial explo-
sion or his engaging in volunteer fire fighting following ex-
plosion was proximate cause of death was for the Industrial
Commission.
Necessity That Employee's Fatal Fall Arise Out of Employment
The necessity of the injury's arising out of employment as well
as in the course of employment was again emphasized in the ma-
jority opinion of the case of Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell,4 previously
before the court on another question reviewed in this survey. The
employee fell (for no explainable reason) while standing at a desk,
on his job. Two days later he died without regaining conscious-
ness, the cause of death, according to physicians, being subdural
3. 229 S.C. 62, 91 S.E. 2d 714 (1955).
4. 227 S.C. 444, 88 S.E. 2d 611 (1955).
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hemorrhage. The court held that there was abundant evidence that
the hemorrhage causing death was brought about by the blow to the
head when the deceased fell backwards on the concrete floor, but
the question then arose whether such fall and the results thereof
were compensable when the cause of the fall was not proven to be
related to his employment. The majority opinion concluded that
the employment must contribute something to the hazard of the
fall and that, in the absence of special condition or circumstance, a
level cement floor in a place of employment was not such hazard.
The court reviewed fully the divided authority on compensability
of death under such circumstances. Acting Associate Justice Lewis
dissented and would have affirmed the Full Commission's reversal
of the Single Commissioner's denial of compensation.
Procedural Matters
(1) Forbearance to Proceed for Compensation as Consideration for
Contract of Employment:
In Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co.5 the interesting question
was raised as to whether an employee could proceed to enforce a
contract of employment until he died or reached the age of sixty-
five years, whichever occurred first, where the only consideration
for the contract was the forbearance of the employee to pursue
the provided remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The
question being raised on demurrer in a suit by the employee for
breach of this contract, the court held such agreement unenforceable
as in violation of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-121
defining the exclusiveness of remedy of Workmen's Compensation,
of Section 72-131, by the terms of which an employer cannot re-
lieve himself by contract of obligations created by the Workmen's
Compensation Act; and of Section 72-132 which states: "No agree-
ment by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this
title shall be valid."
(2) Waiver or Estoppel by Employer:
On the other hand, relief from the filing of claim within the one
year statutory limitation was granted the employee in the case of
Poole v. E. L DuPont DeNernours & Company6 on the theory of
waiver or estoppel of the employer to insist on such limitation under
the following facts:
Employee sustained a back injury which was immediately reported
to the employer. Subsequently, for approximately thirteen months
5. 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E. 2d 486 (1955).
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he was treated by employer's first aid and medical department and
for approximately sixteen months was paid his regular wages. The
claim was filed approximately seventeen months after the injury,
within one month after last payment of disability wages, and within
approximately four months after last medical services were furnished
by the employer.
The court concluded that "the course of conduct of the employer
with regard to the injury of the claimant was such as to reasonably
give rise to a belief on the part of the claimant that the employer
had assumed responsibility for his injury and that the filing of a
claim would be unnecessary."
(3) Employers' Liability under Award Subsequently Reversed:
The construction of CODE oF LAWS oV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 72-356 came before the Supreme Court again in the case of Bag-
well v. Ernest Burwell, Inc.7 In this case, involving death of an
employee, the Single Commissioner denied compensation in his
opinion and award. The Full Commission reversed the hearing
Commissioner and held the case compensable, ordering the payment
of the sum of $25.00 per week from the date of death, October 12,
1952, for a period of 350 weeks as per the provision of law for death
benefit. Notice and grounds of appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas were duly served July 17, 1954, and argued September 1,
1954, before the Resident Judge of the Circuit. Respondent's at-
torneys agreed to extend the thirty days for which an appeal shall
act as supersedeas under the Code Section to sixty days. Thereafter,
on September 27, 1954, motion was made before the Presiding
Judge of the Circuit for an Order requiring appellants to comply
with the award. This Order was granted requiring payment of all
accrued compensation of the award from date of death to date of the
Order.
Appellants then proceeded to have the Order stayed pending a
hearing and final decision in the Supreme Court.
The following part of Section 72-356 was in question:
In case of an appeal from the decision of the Commission on
questions of law, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for
thirty days only and thereafter the employer shall be required
to make payment of the award involved in the appeal or certifi-
cation until the questions at issue therein shall have been fully
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Title.
The court held that the language of this section clearly required
7. 227 S.C. 168, 87 S.E. 2d 583 (1955).
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that weekly payments ordered in an award continue until the- case
is "fully determined upon appeal."
The court reasoned as follows as to the legislative intention re-
flected in the statute:
Doubtlessly, the thirty day provision is a signal from the Legis-
lature to the litigants, to the Industrial Commission, and to the
lower Court to proceed With dispatch in order that the employee
may receive prompt compensation and not be a charge on the
public. The number of cases appealed to the Circuit Court and
not heard within thirty days must be relatively small, and ex-
perience will show that of such cases most are affirmed. The
benefits to the great number of injured employees obscures the
possibility that in an extraordinary situation some employee
might gain undeserved benefits as a result of a ruling later made
by the Circuit Court reversing the Commission. If the pay-
ments are not made in compliance with the statute, the worker
will suffer; and if made and the award later reversed, the em-
ployer and its carrier will suffer. Therefore, there is no perfect
solution, but it can be reasonably assumed that the insurance
carrier took under consideration this provision of the Act and
the time of determining the employer's premium rate.
It is noteworthy that the court limited its opinion to the payment
of weekly amounts set forth in the Award and intimated no opinion
as to the applicability of the section to lump sum payments.
Also, as noted in the concurring opinion of Justice Stukes (in
which Justice Oxner joined), the opinion in this case is apparently
in conflict with that of Miller v. Springs Cotton Mills.8 The award
in this case was reversed subsequently to the rendition of the Order
with which the instant appeal is concerned, and at the time of the
decision an appeal was pending from the judgment reversing the
award. The concurring opinion commented thus on this turn of
events:
Therefore, financial hardship may ensue to the employer and
the insurance carrier, but I have concluded that a fair construc-
tion of the statute as written admits of that result.
(4) Appeal from Interlocutory Order of the Industrial Commission:
In the case of Chastain v. Spartan Mills9 the Supreme Court ap-
plied the rule in construing the statute allowing appeals from awards
8. 225 S.C. 326, 82 S.E. 2d 458 (1954).
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in cases before the Industrial Commission, (CODE or LAWS olt SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-356) that appeals do not lie from interlocu-
tory orders unless such orders affect the merits of the case.
In this case, claimant had first, in 1951, reached an agreement
with the employer as to temporary total disability and medical ex-
pense. In 1953 a controversy arose as to claimant's right to addi-
tional compensation and medical expense. After a hearing, the
Single Commissioner issued his opinion and award denying all of
the employee's claims and dismissing the case. On appeal to the
Full Commission the case was ordered remanded to the Single Com-
missioner for additional testimony. The latter order was affirmed
by the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court being confronted by the
question of appealability, concluded:
The order not being either a final one or an intermediate one
affecting the merits or depriving appellants of a substantial
right, the circuit court was without jurisdiction, in that state of
the proceeding, to consider the appeal on its merits.
Other cases of interlocutory orders, or those not affecting the
merits, so as to be unappealable, cited by the court were: one allow-
ing a claimant to amend his claim; one holding the case in abeyance
for later determination of disability; one granting both parties the
right to take additional testimony; and one granting claimant's
petition for introduction of further evidence.
The court found no conflict between this decision and that of In
re Crawford,10 which involved the power of the Full Commission
to grant a rehearing after it had made its award, or with Strange
v. Heath,'1 where the Full Commission had made its award without
having disposed of appellant's application to take further testimony,
or with Cord v. E. H. Hines Construction Co., 12 where an order of
the Full Commission affirming an Order of the Hearing Commission-
er denying appellant's motion for medical examination of the claim-
ant was held to have deprived appellants of a substantial right in
presenting their defense.
(5) Measure of Partial Disability:
In the case of Utica-Mohawk Mills v. Orr13 a Declaratory Judg-
ment under CODE or LAWS O SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2001
was sought construing an Award of the South Carolina Industrial
10. 205 S.C. 72, 30 S.E. 2d 841 (1944).
11. 212 S.C. 274, 47 S.E. 2d 629 (1948).
12. 220 S.C. 356, 67 S.E. 2d 677 (1951).
13. 227 S.C. 226, 87 S.E. 2d 589 (1955).
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Commission as follows:
It is ordered that the defendants shall pay to the claimant,
Curtis Orr, compensation equal to sixty (60%) per cent of the
difference between the average weekly wage he earned before
the injury and the average weekly wage which he is physically
able to earn after the injury for thirty (30%) per cent per-
manent disability to the body as a whole, not to exceed the com-
pensable rate of Twenty-Five and no/100 ($25.00) Dollars
per week.
The pertinent section of the Trial Court's Order was as follows:
The Commission has found as a fact that defendant (claimant)
has sustained a thirty (30%) per cent disability to the body as
a whole. We must therefore arrive at the diminution of wages
in dollars and cents as produced by the accident.
The record reveals that at the time of the injury, the Defendant
(claimant) was earning Fifty-six and 05/100 ($56.05) Dollars
per week; a loss of thirty (30%o) per cent earning power (dis-
ability) would reduce these wages by $16.815 per week, but the
Act (Code Sec. 72-152) allows recovery of only sixty (60%)
per cent of this loss or $10.089 per week which fixes Defen-
dant's (claimant's) compensable rate.
The accident having occurred on April 14, 1951, there has ac-
crued to August 6th, 1954, a total of one hundred seventy-three
(173) weeks, of which, one hundred twenty-four (124) weeks,
have been paid, leaving due as of August 16, 1954, Four Hun-
dred Ninety-Four and 35/100 ($494.35) Dollars, being the
compensable rate of $10.089 per week multiplied by fifty (50)
(forty-nine interpolated) weeks. The remaining one hundred
twenty-six (126) (one hundred twenty-seven interpolated)
weeks, which will complete the three hundred (300) weeks from
the date of the injury provided under the Act has not accrued, and
will be payable only in case no wages are earned by the de-
fendant (claimant) during said time, or if wages are earned, in
the ratio such wages reduces defendant's (claimant's) earning
capacity as fixed by his compensable wages. 'The disability is
to be measured by the employee's capacity or incapacity to earn
the wages which he was receiving at the time of his injury.'
Keeter v. Clifton Manufacturing, supra (225 S.C. 389, 82 S.E.
2d 520).
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under the terms of CODE or LAws or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-
153, except that the trial court had failed to allow appellant credit
for overpayment of compensation for some weeks where payment
was made as for total disability instead of partial.
8
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